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Abstract 
 
As the 21st century began in Australia, 91% of all Australians were covered by superannuation. In turn, total superannuation assets 
had reached $960 billion by the first quarter of 2006 with balances in superannuation funds now the largest financial asset held by 
households. This substantial growth in superannuation coverage did not, however, occur as a result of free market forces operating 
between producers and consumers in the superannuation industry. Rather, this increase can be directly traced to the level of 
intervention in the industry by both the Labor and Coalition Governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This pattern has again 
been replicated in the 21st century with a ‘trilogy” of major superannuation reforms occurring in the period from 2001 to 2006 
including the 2004 Registrable Superannuation Entity licensing (RSE) regime. 
 
However, in spite of the public interest rationale provided by both governments, these regulatory reforms have failed  to achieve 
recognition as a vehicle for advancing the welfare of Australian workers in their role as superannuants or for improving the welfare 
of the nation. Rather, criticisms relating to interest group lobbying for private gains continue to grow unabated. At the centre of this 
controversy are two key issues: 1) while fund member benefits from these reforms are limited, the associated compliance costs of 
fund governance, which are deducted from fund member returns, approached $200 million per year in 2006; and 2) the primary 
winners of the regulatory interventions, in terms of, for example, improved return-on-asset figures, appear to be the industry fund 
managers. 
 
With  further major reforms looming and given both the critical importance of this issue at an individual and social level and the 
scarcity of existing cost/benefit studies in this area, this research paper seeks to fill this present gap in understanding. The analysis of 
these opposing claims will be undertaken within the public and private interest theories of regulatory reform and will include a 
review of summary data obtained from a recent trustee-based survey2 on the actual costs incurred and benefits received in relation 
to the RSE reforms.  
 
This analysis highlighted that, while some benefits were delivered as a result of the RSE licensing process, in terms, for example, of 
formal risk management strategies being adopted, these benefits appear to be outweighed by four key losses/costs for fund members. 
These losses/costs can be summarised as: 1) member benefits associated with “closed” funds have been transferred to the master 
funds in the retail industry in spite of the fact that there is a priori evidence that retail/master funds have the highest expenses and 
lowest returns of all fund types; 2)  the compliance costs associated with implementing the RSE reforms have been estimated at $50 
million with ongoing costs estimated at a further $10 million per year;  3)  the fact that the overall compliance costs of the two and 
half decades of regulatory reforms in the occupational superannuation industry is now approaching $200 million per year which is a 
direct reduction to fund member balances; and 4) in the absence of any anti-trust legislation, the remaining large firms in the 
industry have the ability to engage in predatory pricing activities which further “rip off” fund members. 
 
 
 
 
1 Corresponding author: Sue Taylor, School of Accountancy, Faculty of Business, Queensland University of 
Technology, Brisbane, Australia. Email: Suzanne Taylor sm.taylor@qut.edu.au
 
2 This survey was conducted by Sue Taylor under Research Grants provided by the Faculty of Business, QUT (Research 
Initiative) and QUT’s Women in Research Schemes. 
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1: Introduction to the Nature and Characteristics of the Regulatory Reforms in the 
Occupational Superannuation Industry 
 
As the twenty-first century began in Australia, the superannuation product was the preferred 
savings vehicle and the centrepiece of the national retirement income strategy of the Federal 
Coalition Government, a legacy of the previous Federal Labor Government which the Coalition had 
chosen to preserve. With 91% of all Australian employees and 81% of all workers at this time 
covered by superannuation, employers and existing members of superannuation funds contributed 
more than $66 billion in the 2004/05 year alone. In turn, total superannuation assets had reached 
$960 billion by the first quarter of 20063 with balances in superannuation funds now the largest 
financial asset held by households and representing almost 20 per cent of private sector wealth4. 
 
Yet, a little less than a decade earlier, and in spite of taxation concessions provided by governments5 
from both sides of politics, superannuation was playing only a peripheral role in securing retirement 
savings for the workforce at large. With only 38% of all employees by 1986 receiving 
superannuation benefits6, it was, rather, the universal old-age pension, which was the key plank of 
the retirement income policies of both political parties.   
 
 
3 These statistics were obtained from the “Statistics: Quarterly Superannuation Performance, September 2006” released 
by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority on the 28th December, 2006. 
 
4 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006, Catalogue No. 4102.0, “Australian Social Trends: Components of Household 
Wealth” and “Australian Social Trend: Distribution of Household Wealth”.  
 
5  Historically, concessional taxation treatment for superannuation benefits had been provided due to the perceived 
desirability of encouraging people to provide for their own retirement. Thus, concessional tax treatment applied for: 
contributions paid to superannuation plans, where employers were allowed a deduction for contributions to a plan 
which were made for the benefit of employee members; the income of benefits paid by superannuation plans; and of 
benefits paid by superannuation plans, by which both the lump sum and pension benefits paid by superannuation plans, 
were subject to concessional tax treatment. 
 
6 Australian Bureau of Statistics 1995, “Australian Social Trends”, Catalogue No. 4102.0. 
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This substantial growth in superannuation coverage did not, however, occur as a result of free 
market forces operating between producers and consumers/fund members in the superannuation 
industry. Rather, this increase can be directly traced to the level of intervention in the operation of 
the industry by both the Labor and Coalition Governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This 
pattern has again been replicated in the 21st century with a ‘trilogy” of major superannuation reforms 
occurring throughout 2001 to 2006 with total compliance costs approaching $200 million per year 
by October 2006 (Clare 2006, p.3) which are deducted from fund member balances.  
 
Within this regulatory reforms process, neither the Labor nor Coalition Governments chose to adopt 
a retirement income policy based on one contributory, universal, government-controlled, national 
superannuation scheme which was the accepted practice in most overseas countries7. Rather, and as 
a result of extensive lobbying against the national scheme primarily by the fund management group 
as detailed in Section 1.6., a decision was taken to construct a regime of privately-controlled, 
mandatory, occupational superannuation. This policy shift was deemed necessary by both 
governments given (although their premises are open to challenge as outlined in Section 1.4.): 
Australia’s ageing population; inadequate savings regime by world standards; and to ensure that the 
publicly funded contribution to retirement incomes remained within the country’s capacity to pay.  
 
These increased retirement savings levels would, then, also contribute to meeting the national 
savings goals (Dawkins 1992, pp. 1-33).  In particular, the Labor Government believed that the 
securing of occupational superannuation benefits for almost all employees would be “..hailed as 
 
7 For example, the Australian scheme was government mandated yet it was to be privately provided, whereas those 
elsewhere were typically government provided; the Australian scheme was by and large fully funded, whereas those 
elsewhere were typically unfunded (i.e. pay-as-you-go-schemes); and the Australia scheme was mainly of the 
accumulations or defined contribution type, whereas those elsewhere were typically of the defined benefit type 
(Bateman and Piggott 1993, pp. 14-15). 
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amongst the finest achievements of the...reformist ALP Government” (Jones in Gruen, 1993, p. 7). 
The resulting “coherent and equitable framework” would permit a higher standard of living in 
retirement than if Australians simply continued to rely on the age pension alone.   
 
However, these reforms have not been recognised as a vehicle for advancing the welfare of 
Australian workers in their role as superannuants or for improving the welfare of the nation. Rather, 
arguments have been raised (as detailed in Section 1.6.) that the timing and characteristics of these 
regulatory reforms can primarily be traced to the interests and actions of the most powerful lobby 
group in the superannuation fund industry, the fund managers (i.e. the producer group). That is, as 
the decade of the 1980s approached, the fund management group (with six life offices dominating 
this market) was facing increasingly high levels of forfeitures, withdrawals and discontinuances in 
both their insurance and superannuation businesses which were threatening their solvency (Office 
of the Life Insurance Commissioner Report 1981, pp. 5-13).  
 
At the centre of these negative trends in the superannuation industry was the existence of a wide 
range of fund member detriments which have been detailed in a range of government reports, 
consumer-based publications and academic research findings [e.g. Australian Federation of 
Consumer Organisations (AFCO) 1991; Klumpes 1994a and 1994b; Senate Select Committee on 
Superannuation 1991, 1992a, 1992b and 1992c; and Taylor 1995, 2005, 2006a]. These detriments 
can be summarised as:  1) poor quality accounting, auditing and information disclosures and 
reporting; 2) the failure of most superannuation funds to produce member booklets and member 
statements and with no member access to Trust Deeds allowed; 3) unequal bargaining power 
between fund members and product producers (i.e. the fund managers), as a result, for example, of 
high market concentration levels and complex product details, with resultant low levels of member 
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rights and benefits; 4) an absence of equal representation (employee and employer) rights within the 
fund; 5) the inability to call meetings, that is, to have any “voice” in the fund management; 6) 
limited “exit” options without incurring significant penalties; and 7) distributional inequities across 
sex, industries and occupation in terms of  both coverage and the nature and types of rights and 
benefits provided under trust deeds. 
 
Choosing not to address the existing fund member detriments in order to reverse these negative 
trends, the fund mangers lobbied instead for a publicly mandated but privately controlled, “pro-
producer”, occupational superannuation product. Within this policy framework, Australian workers 
are forced to contribute to their own retirement but without retaining the right to terminate their 
superannuation product irregardless of the quality of the services provided, the fees charged or the 
total compliance costs they are being forced to pay8. This legal and institutional framework has the 
potential to transfer significant levels of wealth from the fund members to the fund managers as 
detailed in Section 1.6. (the Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations (AFCO) 1991; 
Borowski et. al. 1991; Considine 1984; Klumpes 1994a and 1994b; Olsberg 1992,1997; Taylor and 
Little 1994; Taylor 1995, 2005, 2006a and the Senate Select Committee on Superannuation 1992).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 While fund members do have some freedom to move between funds under the “Choice of Funds” legislation, this 
benefit has been severely eroded given, for example, that the regulatory reform process only requires minimal levels of 
disclosure to be provided to fund members (in terms, for example, of fees and charges). Thus, it is claimed that 
producer groups can charge excessive prices without the risk of a fund member backlash given that “…the information 
provided to fund members failed to give them the capacity to make informed comparisons between funds and between 
investment options based upon fees and charges (Ageing Agenda Social Policy Consultants 2006, p. 6). This matter is 
discussed in more detail in Section 1.6. 
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1.2. Primary Objective of Paper: 
 
With more major reforms looming9 and  given both the critical importance of this issue at an 
individual and social level and the scarcity of existing cost/benefit studies in this area, this research 
paper seeks to fill this present gap in understanding. Two key steps have been taken to ensure that 
the issues associated with the opposing claims are clearly identified. Firstly, the regulatory theory 
analytical frameworks of the public and private interest models of regulatory reform will be utilised to 
analyse the origins, characteristics and outcomes of the occupational superannuation industry reforms 
with a focus on the 2004 Registrable Superannuation Entity (RSE) licensing regime. To achieve this 
outcome, the basic principles and assumptions of both the private and public interest regulatory 
frameworks are elaborated in Section 1.4 and are then applied to the RSE licensing regime reforms in 
Section 1.6. 
 
Secondly, the analysis within this paper will be based upon data obtained from a recently conducted, 
trustee-based survey10 related to the actual costs and benefits experienced in relation to the RSE 
licensing regime as detailed by ninety (90) superannuation fund trustees and licensees. This reform 
was selected for analysis given that it is widely regarded as the most significant event in the 
regulation of the near trillion dollar superannuation industry since occupational superannuation 
gained mandatory status in 1992 (SuperReview 2005, p. 1; ASFA 2004, p. 1). For example, at the 
 
9 That is, the 2006 (Commonwealth Government) Parliamentary Inquiry into the Structure and Operation of the 
Superannuation Industry. This regulatory intervention is again controversial with the ACTU viewing these reform 
proposals as an attempt by the Coalition Government to further diminish the value of fund member “choice” by: 
“…pushing the remaining industry funds towards privatisation [i.e. away from their current not-for-profit status] and, 
incredibly, public listing…which will enable shareholders to skim off dividends and capital gains from the retirement 
savings of fund members…If this was to occur, millions of superannuation fund members would be denied the choice 
they now have to invest with not-for-profit funds operated solely in the interests of members (ACTU 2006, pp. 7-8)”. 
 
10 This survey was conducted by Sue Taylor under Research Grants provided by the Faculty of Business, QUT 
(Research Initiative) and QUT’s Women in Research Schemes. 
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end of this licensing process, associated compliance costs to-date had reached $50 million and more 
than 850 superannuation funds had exited the industry (Clare 2006, p. 3; Taylor 2006, p.5). In 
addition, and in spite of the Coalition Government’s fund member protection rationale for its 
introduction, while billions of dollars of fund member monies had changed hands, few if any 
benefits for fund members were recognised by the trustees surveyed (refer Table 1 G in Section 
1.6).  
 
1.3.  Limitations of Scope  
In meeting the primary objective of this paper, three related issues, although of importance, are felt to 
be outside the scope of this study. First, an analysis of the limitations of each of the two theoretical 
perspectives used has not been provided.  Second, while the original rationale of the Labor 
Government (which was then supported by the Coalition Government in introducing the RSE 
regime) contained four separate premises in terms of: an ageing Australian population; the existence 
of a low saving rate by world standards; a significant trend to earlier retirement; and the need, 
therefore, for a compulsory earnings replacement program, the basis of these four premises are open 
to challenge. For example, did individuals in Australia actually save too little for retirement and, if 
so, why was this the case, and are compulsory earnings replacement programs indeed the most 
efficient and equitable mechanism to achieve an increase in collective retirement savings? Given that 
these considerations are outside the scope of this research, the analysis within this paper is 
conducted on the assumption that these premises are valid. 
 
1.4.  Regulatory Theory Analytical Framework: Public and Private Interest  Models 
 
a)  Public Interest Theory: Principles, Assumptions and Validity of Application to the 
Occupational Superannuation Industry Regulatory Reforms 
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Public interest theory has a long tradition in welfare economics and is built on the fundamental 
assumptions that economic markets often are subject to market failures and, as a result, operate 
inefficiently. Government reform to correct these market failures is, simultaneously, critically 
important to the well-being of society and virtually costless. Thus, the public interest paradigm is 
based on the assumption that the government will act on behalf of the public to improve welfare 
(i.e. make everyone better off) in situations where the market has failed to do so. While these 
assumptions are open to challenge, as highlighted above, they are accepted as valid for the purposes 
of this analysis. 
 
Public interest literature highlights that there are two more established concepts of this paradigm 
(Posner 1974, p. 336; Mitnick 1980, pp. 92-93; Needham 1983, pp. 270-279; Crew & Rowley 1988): 
the consumer-protection concept (refer to Diagram 1.1); and the national-interest concept (refer to 
Diagram 1.2). 
 
Diagram 1.1. The Consumer-Protection Concept of Public-Interest Theory 
  
  Issues   → Agents   → Public   →  Political  → Public- 
    [Consumers] Opinion Decisions Interest 
    ↑           ↓  
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
As highlighted in Diagram 1.1 above, the consumer-protection concept of the public-interest11, 
primarily defines regulation as a device for the protection of consumers against monopoly power, or 
 
11 An example of an Australian consumer protection regulation is the 1974 Trade Practices Act (Cth) (TPA).  Introduced by 
the Whitlam Labor Government, the TPA was motivated by extensive pressure from consumer lobby groups who argued 
that "private individuals, in acquiring goods and services for private use, increasingly find themselves to be in a 
disadvantageous position in dealing with the business community on which they must rely for the supply of those goods and 
services" (Taperell et. al.  1983, p. 563).   In turn, the Attorney-General argued that “…the existing law is still founded on the 
principle known as caveat emptor - meaning `let the buyer beware'.  That principle…has ceased to be appropriate as a 
general rule…the [TPA] will provide such protection (Federal Attorney-General quoted in Taperell et. al. 1983, p. 568).    
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more generally it is a device supplied in response to public demand for rectification of inefficient or 
inequitable market practices by individuals and organisations.  That is, the "victims of economic change 
should not be placed at the mercy of the impersonal market, but should instead be protected by a 
mechanism that provides economic justice" (Mitchell and Munger 1991, p. 20).  Within this 
framework, regulation is intended by legislatures to…"protect consumer interests by securing 
improved economic performance...compared with an unregulated situation" (Fels 1982, pp. 32-33)”.    
 
This perspective is based on the perception that the interests of consumers are translated into legislative 
action through the operation of the political market place.  Within this market, votes are seen as a form 
of currency, and the policies, or at least the images, presented by the competing candidates for office 
are the commodities being bought (Mitnick 1980, pp. 91-108).   
 
While the analogy with the traditional economic market is not strong, public-interest theorists argue 
that even given a total lack of a `market', individuals can maintain their ability to articulate demands.  
Hirschman (1970) has presented an analysis of the different means of articulating interests and shows 
that, in some situations, individuals can rely on what he calls `exit'; for example, an individual can 
purchase a commodity from another seller, or give his/her vote to another candidate.  Thus, given a 
non-market situation, individuals are still able to use their right of `voice' by making demands, 
complaints, or threats in order to achieve the desired goals.   
 
This consumer-protection concept is based on two major assumptions (Posner 1974, 335). First, that 
there are agents (e.g. entrepreneurial politicians and public-interest groups) who will seek regulation on 
behalf of the `public-interest' (Baldwin, Scott and Head 1998).  "These agents may satisfy their self-
interest instrumentally through pursuit of public-interest objectives...but the theory requires that at 
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least some preferences for the public interest be genuine and terminal" (Mitnick 1980, p. 91). The 
second assumption is that economic markets are subject to a series of market imperfections or 
transactions failures, which if left uncorrected, will result in both inefficient and inequitable outcomes.  
The alternative, national interest, concept of `the public-interest'12, as highlighted in Diagram 1.2 
below, centres on the achievement by the government of social goals in which national objectives are 
held to be in `the public-interest' and therefore to supersede private interests.  This concept is 
fundamentally different to the consumer-protection rationale which is based on the mobilisation of 
public opinion which is explicitly articulated to the government by `public-interest' agents to ensure 
certain outcomes.  Rather, the national-interest concept is motivated by the government itself with no 
explicit request from the general public or their agents.   
 
Diagram 1.2. The National Interest Concept of Public-Interest Theory 
 
  Issues    → Agents → Political → Public-Interest 
    [Government] Decisions  
        
  ↑          ↓ 
     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Governments in this case argue that they have an implicit mandate to undertake national-interest 
programs as a function of their election to office and are, therefore, their own `agents'. In this situation, 
the `public-interest' is a passive recipient of “paternalistic” government regulation which has been 
designed to achieve a `national-interest' objective (Bjornstad and Brown 2004). 
 
 
12 An Australian example of regulation in the `national-interest' can be found in the original introduction of the National 
Health Scheme (Medibank) in 1975 by the Whitlam government which felt that "health standards in an advanced 
country must, to a substantial degree, be a national concern" (Brown 1983, p. 2).  The objective of the Whitlam 
Government here was to establish a single health insurance fund to finance a minimum level of medical and hospital 
benefits to which the whole population was entitled.  This fund was, in turn, to be largely financed through a 1.35% 
levy on taxable incomes (Brown 1983, pp. 74-75). Thus, while individual Australian workers were required to subsidise 
their own health requirements, they were collectively to receive a guarantee of access to a minimum standard of health 
care.   
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The public interest model therefore provides a relevant analytical framework for reviewing the RSE 
licensing regime given that, firstly, as briefly outlined above and further detailed in Section 1.6., the 
occupational superannuation industry was characterised by a wide range of consumer detriments 
which needed to be addressed in the “public-interest”.  Secondly, the Coalition Government’s 
objectives for this reform contained elements of both the consumer-protection and the national 
interest concepts of public interest theory. That is, the RSE reform was designed to both optimise 
the security of retirement benefits through the introduction of appropriate prudential measures and, 
thereby, maximise national savings rates.   
 
b)  Private  Interest Theory: Principles, Assumptions and Validity of Application to the 
Occupational Superannuation Industry Regulatory Reforms 
 
In contrast to this public interest basis for the introduction of the RSE regulatory reforms, private-
interest theory is based on the power of private interest groups and was developed in the mid-1980s by 
economists in response to a growing number of research findings which highlighted that government 
regulations appeared, in many cases, to have served the interests of small, powerful interest groups, 
rather than the public interest. Within this framework, government regulation is seen as a market for 
wealth transfers with politicians having the power to coerce to affect wealth transfers and this product 
is then “sold” by politicians. To become the “highest bidders” in this lobbying process, private-interest 
theorists argue that voters form special interest groups, which, in turn, are often able to exert a 
powerful influence on the outcome of the political process.  The sale price takes either (or both) the 
form of explicit payments to Governments (e.g. bribes, campaign contributions etc.) or more subtle 
forms of payment (e.g. “assurances” of voter support by a particular interest group) (Stigler 1971, pp. 
3-21; Posner 1974; pp. 343-356; Peltzman 1976; pp. 212-214; Becker 1983, pp. 371-399; 1985 pp. 
330-347; Noll 1989, pp. 1266-1282; Mitchell and Munger 1991, pp. 512-46). 
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Within the private-interest model, Stigler and his fellow theorists (Olson 1965, Stigler 1971, Peltzman 
1976; 1989; Becker 1983 and Krosner & Strahan 1998) assume that government officials, like 
business executives or consumers, are rationally self-interested.  That is, they will seek to maximise 
their votes (if they are elected officials) or their prestige and wealth (if they are appointed officials) or 
both. “Producer”, private-interest groups in particular can supply these resources by providing 
campaign contributions to elected officials and by supplying lucrative opportunities for post-
government employment. The very essence of private-interest theory is, therefore, that regulation is a 
device for transferring income to well-organised groups if the groups will return the favour with votes 
and contributions to politicians.  
 
For example, in relation to the occupational superannuation industry, contributions are made on a 
regular basis from fund managers to both the Labor and Coalition Governments and at both the State 
and Federal levels as highlighted in Table 1 A. The full extent of these superannuation industry 
contributions are difficult to determine, however, as many of the contributions in the “Total 
Donations” column were made by private companies with an absence of details provided in relation to 
any affiliations. 
 
Table 1 A: Political Contributions13
 
Year of 
Contribution 
Total Donations $  Total $ 
Superannuation 
Industry Donations 
1987 3193658 2500.00 
1988 . . 
1989 . . 
1990 1681057 5000.00 
1991 3905711 87500.00 
1992 . . 
1993 5610389 185000.0 
1994 9435839 246500.0 
1995 3411058 204040.0 
1996 10817605 241746.0 
1997 4595156 261804.0 
1998 6194395 244755.0 
                                                 
13 Federal and State Level Data - Australian Labor and Coalition Parties – details extracted from hard copies of 
Funding Disclosure Reports specifically made available by the Australian Electoral Commission in their 
Brisbane office – Partial Only Data Set Available - 1987 to 2004 – No data available prior to 1987 or for 1988, 
1989 and 1992. 
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1999 3039484 130000.0 
2000 4088837 145000.0 
2001 6753046 212500.0 
2002 2813152 444954.0 
2003 4053488 263500.0 
2004 8450038 268000.0 
 
 
Within the private interest model, these political contributions are provided in exchange for beneficial 
regulation including: price fixing, restriction of entry, subsidies, and suppression of substitutes. Again, 
applying these concepts to the data provided in Table 1 A, the private interest argument would be that 
the significant increases in contributions from the 1991 year through to 1994 in particular, were 
“producer” payments made in exchange for the publicly mandated but privately controlled 
occupational superannuation regulatory regime that commenced in 1992. These regulatory reforms 
effectively: eliminated substitutes; created significant barriers to survival for smaller, existing firms and 
barriers to entry for new firms via the introduction of minimum capital and qualification requirements; 
and imposed significant compliance costs with more than 1000 pages of prudential controls (i.e. the 
Superannuation Industry Supervision Act and Regulations (C’th) 1993 and 1994 respectively) which 
required trustee compliance. 
 
Given that the producer group is generally very small relative to the consumer group, and where profits 
are potentially large, producers face a significant per person incentive to seek regulation which 
provides benefits to them. On the other hand, consumers face an insignificant incentive per person to 
oppose regulation. Thus: 
 
 “...[While] many of the proponents of…regulation intended it to protect consumers against 
excessive charges and discriminations [and] all the early state laws bear witness to this 
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intent…it should be remembered, however, that behind this laudable social purpose lurked 
the sinister forces of private privilege and monopoly.  They desired immunity from 
prosecution under the antitrust laws, legal validation of their privileges as property rights, 
the protection of the state for their monopolies, and a relatively free hand to extend their 
economic power.” (Gray quoted in Noll 1989, p. 6). 
 
The final portion of the “protective” regulatory shield sort by the incumbent producers then, is to 
ensure that these benefits are “delivered” by the government in an in-transparent manner, such as in 
the form of highly technical and complex supervisory regulations which allow little scope for fund 
member/consumer recognition of the ‘hidden’ benefits/subsidies to producers and, therefore, see no 
reason to mount any form of counter lobbying campaign.  
 
Within this model, the belief is that (Olson 1982, p. 68; Mitchell 1990, p. 87) the demands of these 
powerful interest groups actually act to “…retard economic growth, cause stagflation and produce all 
sorts of social rigidities that promote inefficiencies in resource allocation.  Once organised, 
“distributional coalitions” can efficiently pursue their own self-interests; …Each coalition will [then] 
seek a larger share of the GNP regardless of social costs. Such groups and coalitions, once formed, 
tend to persist; those who cannot organise will be harmed. And, in the long run, everyone is harmed 
through the sharing of a smaller GNP” (Olson quoted in Mitchell 1990, p. 87). 
 
Thus, in summary, the fundamental premise of the private interest model is that producers (i.e. the 
owners of the regulated firms) are almost always the most powerful lobbyists within the context of 
the regulatory reform process given that they are usually a well-organised, well-resourced, compact 
user group. This lobbying power was then utilised whenever deemed necessary to “harness” the 
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coercive power of the government to capture benefits for the industry’s owners/producers at the 
expense of the more dispersed groups such as fund members/consumers.  
 
In turn, these regulated firms were found to be at their most effective when: a) the benefits are 
concentrated among group members and these members have an homogeneous interest; b) when the 
costs of the regulation are relatively diffused, which ensures that potential losers have less incentive 
to lobby against any regulation sought by the “winners”; and c) where the issue is both a salient one 
for the producer group and of a complex nature requiring specialist knowledge or training to 
understand (which then places consumers at an immediate disadvantage). In turn, when these pro-
producer characteristics are present in an industry, it can be more cost effective for producers to 
simply lobby for “regulatory privileges” such as mandatory product status, rather that incur the costs 
of correcting any inefficiencies associated with their product production (Olson 1965, Stigler 1971; 
1988; 1991, Peltzman 1973; 1976; 1989; Becker 1983).  
 
Where these types of reforms occur, then the private interest theorists predict significant wealth 
transfers from the fund members/consumers to the producer groups (fund managers). For example, 
in a research study focusing on the effect of interest group lobbying of governments on the 
distribution of income (and based on an analysis of cross-sectional data from the 50 U.S. states), 
Shugart, Tollison and Yan 2003, p. 452, concluded that “…income inequality is an increasing 
function of interest-group influence” when factors such as educational attainment, median income, 
race and state government expenditures relative to gross state product are held constant. 
 
While the assumptions of private interest theory are open to challenge, as highlighted in the 
limitations section 1.4 above, they are accepted as valid for the purposes of this analysis.  
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The application of the private interest framework can be considered a valid alternative (or 
complementary) model for the analysis of the RSE reforms, given that at the heart of the opposing 
claims is the belief that, firstly, the publicly-mandated but privately-controlled legislative regime: 
eliminated substitutes and created both barriers to entry and to survival; involved concentrated 
benefits for homogeneous producers (i.e. the fund managers) while the benefits were diffused 
among millions of fund members (which ensures that they have less incentive to lobby against any 
“pro-regulation” sought); and the mandatory, occupational superannuation product is both complex 
and a salient one for the producers.  
 
Secondly, the government’s use of the concepts of fairness and the “public interest” were not 
consistently matched with appropriate forms of regulation with existing fund member detriments 
not being addressed.  Rather, it is claimed that many of the regulatory reforms introduced have 
been designed to benefit the powerful lobby group of the industry “producer group” (i.e. the fund 
managers) at the expense of both the fund members and society in general (Klumpes 1994b; Gallery 
and Gallery 2005; Taylor 2005 and 2006a). These issues will be discussed in detail in Section 1.6. 
 
1.5. Validity of Models and Key Issues to be Addressed: Application to the Registrable  
 Superannuation Entity (RSE) Licensing Regime 
 
In order, firstly, for the public interest claims to be accepted as valid, it would be expected that the 
timing/origins of the RSE regulatory reforms will be located in the existence of consumer and/or 
national interest-based detriments or failures. Further, a review of the characteristics of the stated 
rationales of both governments for regulatory reform; their associated objectives and the actual 
content of the regulatory provisions would also reveal consistency with public interest theory 
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assumptions and predictions.  Finally, then, in relation to regulatory impacts, there should again be 
clearly identified fund member and/or national interest “gains” from the RSE reforms.  
 
On the other hand, if the private interest-based “dissenting views” are to be accepted as valid, it 
would be expected then that a review of the characteristics and attributes of the stated rationales of 
both governments for regulatory reform; the associated objectives; and the actual content of the 
regulatory provisions and framework introduced, would reveal that they were all consistent with the 
assumptions and predictions flowing from the private interest model of regulatory reform.  Finally, 
then, in relation to regulatory impacts, there should again be clearly identified fund manager 
“gains” from the RSE reforms.  
 
Alternatively, rather than providing competing outcomes, the public and private interest 
frameworks may indeed be complementary with, in this case, both fund managers and fund 
members and/or “the national interest” receiving gains from the RSE reforms. 
 
1.6. Application of the Public and Private Interest Regulatory Theory Models to the 
Registrable Superannuation Entity Reforms: 
 
a) Government Rationale and Objectives for Occupational Superannuation Industry 
Regulatory Reforms: 
 
Underlying the regulatory interventions of both governments throughout the last two and half 
decades has been three key, public interest-based, objectives which can be summarised as 
(Australian Liberal Party’s 2004 Election Policy Statement; Dawkins 1992): 1) Performance: to 
optimise the level of retirement benefits accumulated from the inflow of contributions through the 
efficient operation of the retirement income market and, thus, achieve a sustained structural 
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improvement in national saving, and; 2) Security: to optimise the security of retirement benefits 
through the introduction of appropriate prudential measures; and 3) Simple, Equitable and Socially 
Justice: to provide a superannuation framework which is simpler, more equitable and which ensures 
social justice. 
 
These objectives are consistent with both the consumer protection and national interest concepts of 
the public interest model outlined in Section 1.4. In turn, the RSE legislative reforms were meant to 
be primarily focused around the achievement of the “security” objective as is detailed below 
(Australian Liberal Party’s 2004 Election Policy Statement).   
 
b)  The Registrable Superannuation Entity Legislative Reforms 2004 (RSE): Nature 
and Characteristics and Outcomes for Fund Members and Fund Managers 
 
1) Nature and Characteristics of Regime: 
 
The RSE licensing regime was implemented as part of the Superannuation Safety Reform Act 2004 
(C’th) and represented the most significant event in the regulation of the nearly trillion-dollar 
superannuation industry since occupational superannuation gained mandatory status in 1992 
(SuperReview 2005, p. 1). The focus of the RSE reforms was to require trustees to implement a 
range of “security” measures designed to improve fund governance such as the requirements for 
each fund to produce a formal risk management plan.  Under the RSE regime, existing trustees 
where given a transition period of two years (i.e. from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2006) within which to 
obtain an RSE licence and register their RSEs. From 1 July 2006, all corporations or groups of 
individuals wishing to act as a trustee for an RSE must be licensed.  
2) Fund Member Welfare Issues 
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There are five major issues of concern for fund member welfare associated with the RSE regime. 
Firstly, the trustee reaction to the RSE reforms and its related compliance costs, particularly 
following so closely behind the earlier implemented Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (C’th) 
(which also contained significant licensing requirements) was that at least 855 superannuation 
trustees exited the industry by the end of its trustee licensing process (Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority 2006, p. 1). The member benefits associated with these funds were then, in 
many cases, transferred to the master funds in the retail industry (primarily operated by the life 
offices) in spite of the fact that research evidence highlights that retail/master funds have the 
highest expenses and lowest returns of all fund types. For example, the not-for-profit, industry 
funds are currently predicted to deliver more than 26% more superannuation on retirement for their 
members than master trusts (Industry Super Funds Media release, September 2006; Coleman, Esho 
and Wong, 2003 p. ii). The outcome of this RSE “security”-based reform then has been to sacrifice 
aspects of the original “performance” objective established by both governments. 
Secondly, many of the existing fund member detriments highlighted in Section 1.1. (such as 
information asymmetries and an absence of ‘exit” and “voice” rights) were actually further 
entrenched and intensified by the RSE reforms in that neither the legislation nor the fund trust deeds 
required that fund members had to be consulted in relation to the move, for example,  to retail 
funds. In addition, the number and nature of the remaining funds for “fund choice” by fund 
members have been significantly reduced. This latter outcome is in conflict with both the “social 
justice and equity” and “performance” objectives. 
Thirdly, as indicated by the useable responses to the survey, total compliance costs incurred to-date 
for the RSE licensing requirements was estimated at $10.3 million (81 trustee responses) with on-
going charges then of $4.5 million (77 trustee responses)  as highlighted in Tables 1 B and 1 C. If 
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these figures are then extrapolated to the 307 trustees that remain after the implementation process, 
then total compliance costs have been estimated at $50 million with ongoing costs estimated at a 
further $10 million per year (Clare 2006, p.3). The major factors then that contributed to this high 
level of costs were: internal administration costs (including trustee time); legal costs and consulting 
fees as set out in Table 1 D. 
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Table 1 B: Total Licensing Process Costs Incurred To Date  
Descriptive Figure  
Total costs (all funds) $10,349,026 
Mean (per fund) $128,753 
Standard deviation $135,966 
Range of responses 0 – $905,000 
  
Total N 81** Cost Responses  - i.e. Exempt and No Response 
Categories Excluded 
 
 
Table 1 C: Estimated Yearly Costs  
Descriptive Figure  
Total annual costs (all funds) $4,242,500 
Mean (per fund) $56,151 
Standard deviation $75,681 
Range of responses 0 – $600,000 
  
Total N 77 * Excluding Exempt Funds and No Responses 
 
 
Table 1 D: Nature of Costs Incurred  
(more than one response provided by some trustees) 
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Fourthly, the overall compliance costs of the two and half decades of regulatory reforms in the 
occupational superannuation industry is now approaching $200 million per year as detailed in 
Tables 1 E and 1 F below when both compliance costs ($135 million) and the supervisory levy 
($43-$50 million) are taken into account (Clare 2006, pp. 3-8).  
Table 1E:  Supervisory levy by fund size, various years (Clare 2006) 
Year $50m $250m $5billion $20 billion 
2001-02 $12,500 $53,000 $53,000 $53,000 
2003-04 $17,500 $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 
2005-06 $21,500 $101,400 $146,800 $290,100 
2006-07 $17,745 $88,725 $164,500 $397,000 
% increase since 2001-02 42% 67% 210% 649% 
 
 
Table 1 F - Structure of the Total Compliance Costs in the Superannuation Sector after the 
RSE Licensing Reforms (Clare 2006) 
Asset Range ($) APRA 2006 Trustee Nos Aggregate ongoing compliance 
costs for funds in each category 
<20m 40 $3 million 
20-100m 80 $6 million 
100-250m 38 $3 million 
250-1,000m 64 $19 million 
1-5b 53 $21 million 
5-10b 19 $11 million 
10-20b 11 $34 million 
20b+ 3 $39 million 
Total 307 $135 million 
 
Finally then, and of the most serious concern for fund member welfare, is that the RSE costs have 
not, according to at least 42% of trustees, resulted in any benefits at all for fund members as 
highlighted in Table 1 G below. 
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Table 1 G - Graphed Percentages of Responses Regarding Benefits 
– Trustee Survey Responses  
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3) Private Interest Gains from the RSE Regulatory Reforms: 
While a formal statistical analysis is needed before any relationships or associations can be stated 
with any certainty, the data provided in Table 1 H and I below highlight that the fund managers/life 
offices were still facing a range of negative investment and growth returns in the 2000 to 2003 
period.  In addition, their return on assets figures were extremely low when compared, for example, 
to overall industry averages for the 1998 to 2002 period which ranged from 4.0 to 4.5, compared to 
the .3 to .6 for life offices (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), “Business Operations and 
Industry Performance” data, Catalogue 8142.0). 
 
Thus, and as outlined earlier, even though occupational superannuation had become a mandatory 
product in 1992 and that the 1993/94 SIS legislative framework had introduced a range of barriers 
to entry/survival for competing new and existing smaller firms, the life offices were still in 
significant financial distress. These same ABS statistics also highlighted that superannuation assets 
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had grown throughout this period from comprising 60% of total life office assets, to representing 
88.4% by 2004. Thus, the non-performance of this asset base was of serious concern to the life 
offices. 
 
The private interest model would, therefore, predict that these continuing poor performance 
outcomes would create strong lobbying pressure by the fund managers/life offices for the 
introduction of an additional range of protective mechanisms which would serve to remedy the 
detriments they faced. This prediction is consistent with the significant new levels of government 
intervention that did occur in the occupational industry from 2001/02 onwards with the introduction 
of the 2001 licensing requirements of the Financial Services Reform Act, the 2004 Choice of Funds 
legislation and the 2004 Registrable Superannuation Entity (RSE) licensing process. The resulting 
outcome of this regulation “trilogy” then should be, if the private interest model is valid, that the 
fund management group would be the primary “winners”. 
 
This prediction is supported by the available information as set out in Table 1 H and I which 
indicate significant improvements in all return, earnings and growth measures from the 2002/03 
period onwards. In addition to the data provided in the Tables below, there has been a wide range of 
media reports which highlight the large scale “wins” by the life offices in terms of gaining control 
of the management of the funds that have exited as a result of the RSE reforms. For example, one of 
Australia’s largest corporate superannuation funds, the Woolworths Group Super Scheme, has 
recently outsourced its $1.2 billion, 21,000 member, corporate fund to AMP. In addition, ING 
Australia has successfully won the accounts of Visy Industries, HPM Industries, the National Heart 
Foundation and Sanofi-Aventis and has been said to be “close to finalising a number of other major 
wins” (Taylor in SuperReview 2006, p. 2). 
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Table 1H: Statutory Fund of Life Offices – Superannuation - Return on Assets and Equity 
(Investment Linked Products) (%) and Return on Net Premium Revenue (%) 
Year  Return on Net 
Premium Revenue 
Return on Assets – 
Investment Linked 
Return on Equity – 
Investment Linked 
1995 Data unavail. .30 20.20 
1996 Data unavail. .40 19.50 
1997 Data unavail. .40 19.80 
1998 Data unavail. .50 24.00 
1999 Data unavail. .50 16.40 
2000 1.9 .40 15.70 
2001 7.8 .40 19.30 
2002 12.8 .40 9.50 
2003 25.9 .20 14.80 
2004 94.1 .60 26.60 
 
 
Table 1I:  Income and Expenditure of Life Offices – Superannuation Business –  
Extract from APRA’s “Statistics: Life Insurance Trends”, September 2005, p. 7.  
 
 
 
 
   2007SOAWPS$200MillionPriceTag/33/27 
 
 27
1.7.   Summary and Conclusion: The Costs and Benefits of the RSE Licensing Regime - Who 
 are the Winners and Losers? 
 
 
This preliminary review of the available evidence related to the RSE licensing regime within, 
firstly,  the public interest regulatory framework, reveals that the origins of this regulatory reform, 
was broadly consistent with only the national interest concept of this theory only. That is, the 
legislative reform provisions sought to bring about improvements in terms of prudential 
control/safety mechanisms which, in turn, would ensure that the superannuation monies under 
investment increased significantly. Within this rationale, there was not attempt to identify and then 
address any existing fund member/consumer detriments. 
 
In terms of the actual outcomes or impacts of the RSE reforms, however, there is no evidence to 
suggest that even these limited national interest objectives have been realised.  Rather, the recent 
data collected from fund trustees, highlights that the combination of: increasing compliance costs; 
the “mass” fund exit; and the resultant transfer of funds worth billions to the more expensive retail 
fund sector, has left member funds, and, therefore, the overall savings pool, worse off, and to an 
extent of nearly $200 million per year.  
 
In addition to compliance costs concerns, recent evidence has also highlighted that the remaining 
large funds within the industry are engaging in anti-trust behaviour. For example, there have been 
recent calls for the immediate review of the Eligible Rollover Fund sector in the occupational 
superannuation industry, following the RSE reforms, given that “some funds were engaged in 
predatory pricing” with estimated losses to fund members of over $100 million per year 
(SuperRatings 2006, p.1). As a consequence of these outcomes, the “performance” and “social 
justice and equity” objectives of both governments have been subjected to negative pressures. 
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On the other hand, and consistent with the principles and assumptions of the private interest 
framework, the fund managers appear to be the real “winners” under the RSE regime. That is, the 
licensing requirements have forced many of Australia’s largest corporate and industry 
superannuation funds to exit the industry with member monies primarily being transferred to the 
retail sector (dominated by the life offices).  
 
The reality is, however, that these “wins” for fund managers (in terms of increasing returns on net 
premium income, assets and equity as highlighted in Section 1.6.) as opposed to the “losses” 
experienced by fund members, were inevitable. That is, given the original Labor Government 
decision (after extensive lobbying for this outcome by the fund managers) to create a publicly-
mandated but privately-controlled occupational superannuation regime (Considine 1994; Klumpes 
1994b), the producer groups were always going to be the primary beneficiaries of the regulatory 
reforms.  
 
Within this policy framework, even though Australian workers are being forced to contribute to 
their own retirement, they have not retained the right to terminate their superannuation product 
irregardless of the quality of the services provided, the fees charged or the total compliance costs 
they are being forced to pay. This latter outcome is a financial windfall for the fund management 
sector which no longer has to face the threat of terminations, surrenders and forfeitures related to 
these occupational superannuation investments.   
 
In conclusion, while some of benefits have been delivered as a result of the RSE licensing process, 
in terms, for example, of better risk management strategies being adopted, these benefits appear to 
be outweighed by four key losses/costs for fund members: 1) member benefits associated with 
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“closed” funds have been transferred to the master funds in the retail industry in spite of the fact 
that there is a priori evidence that retail/master funds have the highest expenses and lowest returns 
of all fund types; 2)  the compliance costs associated with implementing the RSE reforms have been 
estimated at $50 million with ongoing costs estimated at a further $10 million per year;  3)  the fact 
that the overall compliance costs of the two and half decades of regulatory reforms in the 
occupational superannuation industry is now approaching $200 million per year which is a direct 
reduction to fund member balances; and 4) in the absence of any anti-trust legislation, the remaining 
large firms in the industry have the ability to engage in predatory pricing activities which further 
“rip off” fund members. 
 
The power of any government to correct this situation, however, is limited given their inability to 
modify the inequitable nature of the underlying publicly-mandated, privately-controlled 
occupational superannuation regime.  That is, the existing framework is the lobbied for outcome of 
the powerful fund management group who viewed single, government-controlled, national schemes 
as a “threat to their profitability”, lobbying extensively against any earlier attempt to introduce such  
a national scheme (Paatsch and Smith 1992, p. 6). Given that this framework is now delivering 
extremely high levels of returns on net premium income, assets and equity for the remaining firms 
(as a result, at least in part, of wealth transfers from fund members) there is little incentive to accept 
an alternate regime. 
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